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ABSTRACT
This paper attends the live music performance in the 21st century to reconsider
German philosopher Walter Benjamin’s theses on the authenticity of art in his 1935
essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Benjamin focuses on
the emergent technology of photography in the 20th century as a method of technical
reproduction of the art object, and, as he indicates, as having “captured a place of its own
among the artistic processes” (219-20). Benjamin proposes several theories on the
mechanical reproducibility and distribution of art within the culture industry, and his
attention to the aura of the art object—“its unique existence at the place where it happens
to be”—is, in my argument, reimagined in an age of digitally-mediated art practice. The
ephemeral experience of live musical performance, I maintain, presents the requisite
space-time to reevaluate the integrity of the art object’s aura. At the core of this analysis
is the connection between the digital reproduction’s aura and its influence on human
apperception, much like how the “Work of Art” essay is structured. Thus, the shift in the
mode of reproducibility—from the mechanical to the digital—reflects a larger change in
the mode of human apperception. Specifically, I am considering the use of digital devices
by individual—and, more-specifically, non-professional—audience members to capture
and reproduce a live music performance. This analysis repositions Benjamin’s theses on
the authenticity of art in the 21st century to contextualize how capturing something as
authentic yet as fleeting as music—especially through a digital device that is rarely out of
arm’s reach—can answer the larger questions of who we are as authentic, individual
beings and how the human experience is contextualized.
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INTRODUCTION: iPHONES AT THE CONCERT
The ephemeral nature of music 1 precipitates a reflection on the authenticity and
authority of art. What is considered original and authentic when each iteration—each
sound encountered in a unique spacetime—comes and goes in a more transitory manner
than would, for example, the observation of a painting? Authenticity of art is the central
theme of German philosopher Walter Benjamin’s 1935 essay, “The Work of Art in the
Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” What is at stake for Benjamin in an age of
reproducibility is the integrity of the aura of the art object and, subsequently, the
influence of the mode of reproduction on human apperception—or, how we contextualize
the world around us. 2 Benjamin defines aura as the element of the original that anchors
its presence to a specific time and space: “its unique existence at the place where it
happens to be” (220). Reproduction is furthermore identified as the act that threatens the
auratic integrity of the original. “In principle a work of art has always been reproducible”
(218), emphasizes Benjamin. But replicas—the product of manual reproduction—are the
precursors to technical reproduction. These replicas were produced by artists and masters
for the purposes of improving their craft but were also carried out by those seeking
financial gain—branded by Benjamin as forgery. “Mechanical reproduction,” Benjamin
makes plain, “represents something new” (218), a grand “shattering of tradition” that had
yet to be fully critiqued in the early 20th century.
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See "ephemeral, adj. and n."
See "apperception, n."
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Benjamin’s approach to this upset of tradition in art practice positioned him to
make a larger observation on society’s desire to eliminate distance. Essentially, he is
using his theses on art as an anchor by which to solidify more of a societal critique as
opposed to a simply artistic one. He describes the auratic component of distance through
the example of encountering a mountain range or the shadow cast from a tree branch—
phenomena of nature. As you “follow with your eyes” these distant vistas (far or near),
“you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch” (222-23). Benjamin’s
critique gives voice to the inability to physically reach into the distance and capture those
mountains or that tree branch. Technical reproducibility, he concludes, is a way for the
viewer to eliminate that distance, a way to bring home whatever view one choses to
frame through the lens of a camera. Photography thus created a rift in the standard 3 of
representation in that, before, only the artist—the painter, the sculptor—could represent
some semblance of reality through art “in its traditional form” (220).
Criticism in the wake of the “Work of Art” essay follows Benjamin in focusing on
auratic decline in the plastic arts. However, the digital reproducibility of art, I am urging,
requires a critique of music as a more ephemeral sphere of art practice. The ephemerality
of music and the comparatively more sophisticated nature of digital reproduction allows
my argument to explore a deeper change within human apperception. This “deeper
change,” I intend to show, will surpass the desire to eliminate distance in its importance
to the human experience. To be clear, this discussion is not an affront to Benjamin’s
theses on art and its reflection of society; instead, it will launch the “Work of Art” essay
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See Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” p. 219.
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into the present moment as an introduction for a contemporary discussion on the methods
of digital reproducibility.
Music, of course, takes center-stage, but why shift the focus away from
photography? After all, photography has by now adapted itself well within the realm of
the digital. But photography today—even in its highly advanced digital form—still
embodies many of the limitations of the plastic. For instance, the digital photograph can
be modified using the DSLR camera that first captured it or by using computer software
like Adobe’s Photoshop, but the final product (again, like a finished painting) is a static,
fixed image. The digitally reproduced live music performance, however, is
comprehended by the audible and visual sensorium, which will later be considered as it
relates to passivity versus concentration and the mode of reproduction’s influence on aura
and apperception. At its core, this analysis takes Benjamin’s theses on the authenticity of
art into the 21st century to help contextualize how capturing something as authentic yet as
fleeting as music—especially through a digital device that is rarely out of arm’s reach—
can help answer the larger questions of who we are as authentic, individual beings and
how the human experience is contextualized.
Benjamin employed photography as the anchor by which to observe mass
culture’s commodification of art. Photographic technology was, at that time, the perfect
platform to discuss aura in tandem with, as he maintains, “[society’s] bent toward
overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction” (223). Live
music as an art object, however, is complicated not only by reproduction of the visual
element of the performance but also by the added dimension of audio’s digital
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transformation. Carl Dahlhaus’ Esthetics of Music sheds light on the sophistication of
music’s objectivity—music as “a focus of esthetic contemplation.” He begins by aligning
music’s foundation with a more plastic artform like painting. 4 Both occur—are produced
and consumed—in space. Music, on the other hand and simultaneously, works in time
unlike the painting: not in the sense the it requires time for the artist to create a still life
with oil on canvas, but time as a mode by which to exchange the musical tones from
musician to audience. 5 And Dahlhaus counters his generosity of music’s relation to the
plastic arts further by writing, “[music’s] objectivity is displayed not so much
immediately as indirectly: not in the moment when it is sounding, but only if a
listener…reverts to what has passed and recalls it into his present experience as a closed
whole” (11). The objectivity of music, therefore, requires a specificity of time and space,
much like how Benjamin frames aura.
In this essay, I apply Benjamin’s theses on art to the digital reproducibility of live
music. My argument is then solidified by reimagining auratic integrity—from original to
digitally reproduced copy—within mass culture’s access to portable digital reproduction
devices like Apple’s iPhone. As a millennial growing up in what I would refer to as the
electronic and digital cultural revolution of the late 1990s and early 2000s, I find that the
most recognizable device is the iPhone. Other smartphone devices are available on the
market, but, for the sake of simplicity, I will reference the iPhone in lieu of other
platforms by Android, Samsung, and Google. Unlike other companies, though, Apple has
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See Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music, p. 9.
Ibid.
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worked with audio and video engineers to allow performers to disable the recording of
their live performance. 6 This patented technology (US Patent 9,380,225), according to an
NPR report, “would use infrared emitters to temporarily deactivate the photo and video
capabilities on devices like mobile phones, laptops, stand-alone video or still cameras or
any other ‘electronic device with an image sensor’” (Tsioulcas). A closer look into the
breakdown of the technology can arguably conclude that the “infrared data” received by
the system would also make capable the capturing of all data being fed into the system.
Essentially, this digital reproduction technology created to bar the use of mobile phones
and other devices at a live performance could simultaneously be used to crowd-source
“data” (or information) that could, in turn, be able to produce something like the Beastie
Boys’ 2006 production, Awesome; I Fuckin’ Shot That! According to London-based
media critic Patrick Tarrant, 7 the film was produced from raw footage taken by 50 fans
who were given cameras to film the show from their own vantage point. Tarrant
describes Awesome as “a collage-like concert documentary” inspired by a fan’s previous
phone recording uploaded to the band’s website. 8 The 2004 concert, held at Madison
Square Garden, presented a novel opportunity for the music industry to capitalize on
audience participation. Apple’s 2016 patent, as well as the Beastie Boys’ Awesome, are
exceptional cases in digital recording capabilities in the 21st century. After a close reading
of Benjamin’s theses on aura and mass culture’s yielding to reproducibility, it is not
surprising to encounter such cases in an age defined by increasing access to digital

See Tiscareno, et al.
See Tarrant, “Camera Movies.”
8
Tarrant, “Camera Movies,” p. 156.
6
7
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technology. But are we now concentrating on the work of art or are we concentrating on
the work of art as it appears through the screen? Or is it now the device that is the focal
point of our attention?
The “increasing significance of the masses” in 20th century industrialized society
provided Benjamin with the opportunity to single out, as he observes, “the desire…to
bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly” (223). No longer limited to the expert or
professional, the act of eradicating distance between the work of art is conducted by the
growing numbers of people equipped with multi-modal smartphones. Typically framed
by the polarity of distraction and concentration before art, Benjamin later remarks, “A
man who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it… In contrast, the distracted
mass absorbs the work of art” (239). Arresting art not by machine but through a more
intimate relationship with the device thus allows a renewed cultural standpoint by which
to observe a shift in the mode of human apperception that Benjamin considers only
briefly in his theses on art. And live music performance, a more ephemeral artform than
photography, is employed in this discussion on art in the digital age in order to illustrate a
renewed shift in the mode of apperception in the 21st century.
This critique, like the “Work of Art” essay, considers both the integrity of aura
and human apperception—not as separate, but as codependent. While Benjamin bridges
the gap between aura’s integrity and human apperception by commenting on the desire to
collapse distance in the age of mechanical reproduction, this argument emphasizes the
authenticity of self within the individual human experience as it relates to art practice and
the reproduction of the art object in the 21st century. The ephemeral nature of music in its
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most basic form—that which, like Benjamin’s aura, is only encountered in a singular
space and time—is predicated by the fleeting original that is, today, reproduced by the
digital devices found in the hands of millions. Here I argue that the device—its
functionality and multimodality—has evolved from a tool to a kind of sacred tether to the
modern world. This multi-dimensional approach to artistic experience is another avenue
where Benjamin’s theses on art breaks down when applied to 21st century digital
reproduction. For the mechanically reproduced copy, while still capable of modifications,
will be shown as comparatively static next to the digital reproduction and the affordances
the device allows its remixability. Thus, the digital age, I will present here, has the
potential—much like what is at stake in the “Work of Art” essay’s critique on the
technical reproducibility of art—to influence human sense perception on an objectively
deeper level than a desire to bring objects closer. While the elimination of distance is still
an integral component of reproducibility in the digital age, I argue that it is being
conducted in the present moment to bring closer an authentic sense of self to the
individual behind the device.
In sum, a shift in the mode of reproducibility reflects a larger change in the mode
of human apperception. For Benjamin, the shift and its technocratic byproducts were
successfully exemplified in the reproduction of the plastic arts. I, however, am observing
digital reproduction in a more fleeting medium of art, one beyond the static nature of
photography that embodies an ever-changing and increasingly global society. Music is
transitory and fluid in a way that can help to illustrate the speed at which events occur,
statuses change, and perception fluctuates in the modern age. Questioning the
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authenticity of an ephemeral artform allows a subsequent questioning of the authenticity
of the self—individual identity in an age of information and digital communication—
which exemplifies the shift in the mode of human apperception in the 21st century. While
it is difficult to predict what will render digital reproducibility obsolete (or, at least, be
considered in the past tense), the ephemeral nature of music and its digital reproducibility
distinguishes the artform from all others. This essay examines—as did Benjamin in the
20th century—the current mode of human apperception at a time when the ephemeral is
endangered by an even more prolific mode of reproducibility, one that is not necessarily
produced by but is, rather, a reflection of 21st century mass culture. This historical
moment is not novel in the endangerment of aura or the ephemerality of music. Their
integrity is in the hands not of those who were once—as Adorno notes—in charge of the
culture industry; however, the individual has the opportunity to engage with integrity
through the do-it-yourself reproduction platforms given agency by the digital device.

8

AURA & APPERCEPTION IN THE AGE OF BENJAMIN
Benjamin’s account of aura is ultimately a phenomenon perceived by the
individual lover of art. Yet, for much of art history’s absence of reproduction’s
distributive potential, art was exclusive to an elite class with privileged access. To view
art in its original form required travel and access to galleries that were, for much of
society, economically out of reach. Following a proliferation of art by way of technical
reproduction, it makes sense that the “Work of Art” essay comments on changes in “the
medium of contemporary perception” (222), but Benjamin’s distribution of attention on
aura and apperception is significantly skewed. On only two occasions in his essay does
he mention the symptoms of “profound changes in apperception” (240); the focus is on
the mechanical reproducibility of art by means of photography and its consequences for
aura. Reproduction technology of the 20th century was in the beginning stages of cultural
integration, and photography was easily-made the focal point of Benjamin’s critique. For
the first time in history, Benjamin observes, the technical reproducibility of art had been
employed on a mass scale. A significant passage at the beginning of Benjamin’s critique
stipulates:
Around 1900 technical reproduction had reached a standard that not only
permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause the most
profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its
own among the artistic processes. (219-220)
Reproduction as an artistic practice was arguably an affront to art for Benjamin and his
contemporaries. Benjamin critiques the birth of photography as having liberated the hand
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of “the most important artistic functions which henceforth devolved only upon the eye
looking into a lens” (219). For Benjamin, this “shattering of tradition” occurred when the
machine replaced what the artist had before accomplished by hand and with simple tools.
Digital reproducibility, however—introduced in the final decade of the 20th century and
flourishing in the 21st—represents something novel all over again, for both the integrity
of aura and how the mode of human apperception is interpreted today. One significant
departure from the age of mechanical reproducibility is the widespread public access to
digital devices, which are produced in such quantities as to be affordable to a greater
number of people. Furthermore, the present moment is witnessing an age of travel and
mobility that helps to dissolve the privileged access to art that before was only afforded
to an elite class of patrons.
Scholars from Theodor Adorno to Miriam Hansen consider the integrity of
Benjamin’s aura as degraded following the original work of art’s technical reproduction
and mass distribution. Adorno’s The Culture Industry provides a critical foundation to
both Benjamin and his theses on art as well as my work to further aura and apperception
in the context of 21st century live music. Adorno contextualizes the work of art within the
schema of mass culture by describing the art object as forming “the technique of
reproduction and presentation, actually a technique for the distribution of a real object”
(64). Monopolization, though, is Adorno’s focus in his critique of auratic integrity. He
considers the habit of the culture industry to mass-produce and monopolize art to be
impeding its singular value or, more clearly stated: “decisive aspects of reality today
elude representation through the aesthetic image” (65). While mechanical reproducibility
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introduced art to the general public on a mass scale, its omnipresence eventually led to
the dismemberment of aura as Adorno and Benjamin feared. Much later, Miriam
Hansen—in “Aura: The Appropriation of a Concept”—would claim that aura according
to Benjamin is “unstable, metamorphic, and relational,” imbued with a “dependence on
particular constellations and acts of reading and interpretation” (119). Here, Hansen steps
away from the public arena to consider the potential of the individual and the singular
approach to the art object’s aura. The onus of appreciation rests not with everyone, but
with you. Both Adorno and Hansen, while writing at different points in critical history
and each with a specific critical agenda, are acknowledging a rift in the artistic tradition
that preceded their present. Any degradation of aura—whether observed by Benjamin,
Adorno, or a more contemporary critic like Hansen—is arguably regarded as an offense
to tradition, and the relatively stable history of art practice lends itself to this kind of
sensitivity. Each of these scholars approach the critical table with a unique agenda, and I
would argue that changes in the tradition of art practice give them pause to consider what
these changes (including their benefits and negative consequences) may bring to the
public art audience.
Much like the historical moment during which Benjamin encountered aura, its
significance and meaning have been shown by contemporary scholars to be changing in
the age of digital reproduction. Miriam Hansen continues to reimagine aura’s integrity in
her Benjamin-defying essay. 9 Her stance classifies the “withering” of aura as
“symptomatic” of “a fundamental shift in the conditions of human sense perception that
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Benjamin in turn attributes to both the new technologies of reproduction and the
increasing importance of the masses in modern life” (113-14). Thus, technology and
society eventually reach a point of homeostasis following any new incorporation of the
former into quotidian life. And once some other technology is introduced, the cycle
begins anew. Hansen furthers her approach to Benjamin’s reconsideration of experience
as entailing an exploration of “new modes of apperception and adaptation equal to a
technologically changed and changing environment” (105). In a way, she has
summarized the impetus of the present study, which is being conducted in response to
changes in the way art is reproduced. Hansen also points to traces of optimism in
Benjamin’s account, as his efforts “revolved around the possibility that the new
technological media could reactivate older potentials of perception and imagination that
would enable human beings to engage productively, at a sensorial and collective level,
with modern forms of self-alienation” (105). This perceptive and imaginative potential I
am here observing within the realm of live music performance and, thus, reimagined
within the sphere of digital reproducibility to illustrate an indeed productive approach to
digitally mediated apperception. For digital reproducibility is not an ideology of
apperception—it is an act used to illustrate digital communication & reproduction
technologies as an aid in understanding human apperception and more contemporary
forms of self-alienation—forms which will be explored below.
The novelty in copying the work of art by means of technical reproducibility
“represents something new,” just as much today as it did during the early 20th century.
Benjamin begins his critical theory focused on how the mode of reproducibility affects
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aura. “In principle a work of art has always been reproducible” (218), he claims. Here,
Benjamin is differentiating between replicas and reproductions. Replicas of art objects
were historically created either for practice (by pupils), dissemination (by artists), or
profit (“by third parties in the pursuit of gain”) from the work of art (218). These copies
were considered to be replicated by the mode of manual reproduction—no machine or
device was involved at all, save for the more traditional tools the artist may use. A
replica— “confronted with its manual reproduction”—was regarded as a forgery.
Reproductions, argues Benjamin, employed a more technical mode than before. By
foregoing the human hand for the components of machinery, the reproduced art object is,
thus, labeled a copy. And while the divide between what is to be considered a copy and a
forgery is dependent upon the purpose of the reproduction, this divide—although not
central to this argument—I would predict becomes increasingly troubled in the digital
reproduction.
Rather late in the “Work of Art” essay, Benjamin mentions the concept of
apperception in tandem with his attention to aura. His analysis is on a decrescendo, and
he affords noticeably little time to explore the consequences of a shift in the mode of
reproducibility on the psyche of the individual or mass culture at large. Again, this
analysis is not attempting to discredit Benjamin—by Section XV of the “Work of Art”
essay, the amount of critical ground already covered is immense, and this final section’s
discussion (which precedes his Epilogue) is compounding on the work accomplished
earlier in the essay. The genesis of my critical exploration into Benjamin’s theses was not
where he ends with apperception, but to bring his novel analytical model into the present
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moment and devote more time to explore the potentials of analyzing the human
experience through the lens of art. Thus, live music is merely the anchor—the tip of a
deeper social iceberg—by which to acknowledge apperception’s metamorphosis in the
21st century.
Apperception describes how humans contextualize something newly encountered
by incorporating it into the mass of experience already possessed in order to comprehend
it within the larger whole of their consciousness. Benjamin stipulates that the desire to
reproduce an art object as “symptomatic of profound changes in apperception” (240). He
critiques this desire by observing how the reproduction of art eliminates a necessary
distance between object and audience. This distance is vital to the integrity of aura, just
as the inability to fully capture a mountain range is arguably what adds to their grandeur.
Not only does Benjamin pin down the changing integrity of aura through reproduction
and the shattering of tradition that its technical reproduction elicits, he essentially is
asking why this is happening, why mass culture is moving in this direction, and how
reproducibility takes such an influential position over society. Benjamin states, “the mode
of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence” (222). I,
too, believe that one’s mode of existence has a direct bearing on how their world is
perceived. This mode, supports Benjamin, “is determined not only by nature but by
historical circumstances as well… And if changes in the medium of contemporary
perception can be comprehended as decay of the aura, it is possible to show its social
causes” (222). I would argue that this statement is the most succinct in explaining what
Benjamin is up to in his theses on art—and what I hope to continue. For the social causes
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resulting not only from the introduction of technical reproducibility of art but also from
the shift in the mode of its reproducibility—from the mechanical to the digital—is the
theoretical basis for understanding questions surrounding a troubled sense of self in the
present moment.
The “Work of Art” essay, however, is largely devoted to the effects mechanical
reproduction has on the art object’s aura. While Benjamin and others like Adorno 10 point
to the degradation of society as a reflection on the decay of aura, Benjamin’s analysis
provides a mere glimpse into the shape these possibilities could take. And while this
analysis is not being conducted to answer the question of why, in his essay, so little space
is afforded to reproducibility’s effect on how society perceives their individual reality,
there are a number of possibilities. Two examples are found when considering the stilldeveloping field of psychology in the early 20th century as well as Benjamin’s limited
access to resources during his research in an age far more analog (i.e. no computers or
web-based search engines) than the present one. Nevertheless, what Benjamin has done
in his theses on art is provide the critical foundation for understanding the individual’s
sense of self in an arguably more sophisticated, complicated age. Without the “Work of
Art” essay, I am unsure this type of analysis could be conducted at all.

10
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FINDING THE EPHEMERAL:
LIVE MUSIC REPRODUCTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Music is ephemeral: its most basic existence is only experienced at the moment of
encounter, in a singular time and space before disappearing. “You can’t touch music,”
announces David Byrne, vocalist and guitarist of The Talking Heads. In his meditation on
How Music Works, he continues: “and yet [music] can profoundly alter how we view the
world and our place in it” (9). Perhaps the ability of music to elude the physical grasp of
listeners while still enacting profound changes in their lives has led to a mix of attraction
and frustration in the human conscience since music was first practiced. While Byrne was
a touring musician in the 1980s, Carl Dahlhaus was describing music as transitory in his
Esthetics of Music: “It goes by, instead of holding still for inspection” (11). Notes from a
piano, vibrations from a cello—the sounds of music cannot be framed and exhibited in a
gallery. Although music is arguably the most fleeting artform, perhaps it is the
ephemerality of music that makes it so ubiquitously received by the human sensorium.
Perhaps it is music—and not a more plastic artform like photography or painting—that
encapsulates what it means to be, only existing in the moment without any connection to
past or future. Reproducing something with such an interpretive potential is troubled the
more it is copied, the more it engages with the non-human element of the machine or the
device.
But reproducing a static art object—an original that can be encountered in
multiple space-times—is only a shallow approach to the potentials of the concept of aura
in the age of digital reproducibility. During the early 20th century, static reproductions of
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art—in the form of photographs—were an enormous feat. Riding on the shoulders of
lithography, photography marked a paradigmatic shift in the way images could be
captured: the world slowed to a halt for passers-by to observe, but in stunning detail that
the human hand before could not capture with canvas and paint. Benjamin points out that
“photography freed the hand of the most important artistic functions which henceforth
devolved only upon the eye looking into a lens. Since the eye perceives more swiftly than
the hand can draw, the process of pictorial reproduction was accelerated so enormously
that it could keep pace with speech” (219). Reproducing art at this speed allowed a quick
incorporation of aesthetic value into the culture industry that had never before been able
to circulate. This incorporation included images of such quality—and consistency—into
the more traditional (i.e. textual) content that was being disseminated in advertisements,
newspaper magazines, and eventually in motion pictures.
Yet copies in the digital age take a new form and are subsequently charged with
different affordances. One difference between music recordings of the age of mechanical
reproducibility and the music industry today is that the line between producer and
consumer is becoming increasingly blurred with the convenience and portability of the
iPhone’s digital recording capabilities—making an audience member at a live
performance able to arrest the art object and immortalize it through the lens of their
digital device. Because one cannot “take home” the original—like Benjamin could not
arrest for his own safekeeping the mountain range or the tree branch’s shadow—its
reproduction retains some semblance of what was beheld. Unlike the final product in the
machine age, however, the “final destination” of the digital reproduction inhabits a
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similarly ephemeral realm in that the act of reproduction—the conversion of art to
information—is rarely the last step. The digital copy can be further remixed and
modified, therefore introducing the affordance of auratic change either during or long
after reproduction. In the case of live music performance, the reproduction can be
captured and modified while the individual behind the device is still experiencing the
singularity of the original. Compared to the technical reproducibility of Benjamin’s
observations, the 21st century approach to the work of art happens on a temporal scale
that is far narrower than the time it took to complete the reproduction process in the 20th
century. The result of such speed in reproduction—within this discussion on 21st century
music—affects not only how art is approached and appreciated by the individual “lover
of art,” but also how the individual approaches and appreciates their reality before,
during, and after the performance.
The plastic arts that preceded the age of Benjamin led to the birth of photography
and the potential for machinic reproduction to influence the way humans perceive their
everyday reality. But the machine not only copied the image, it helped to transport it on a
scale far wider than imagery had ever before been distributed. Although concentrating on
the image in the digital world, Boris Groys 11 helps to contextualize the parallel that
anything digital does not need the exhibition space. Because of their reproducibility, they
travel “spontaneously and anonymously throughout the open fields of contemporary
means of communication, such as the Internet or cell-phone networks, without any
centralized curatorial control” (23). The key work here is control, and without the
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traditional limits placed on the exhibition of art, the elite class is no longer the only
audience with the privilege of consumption.
Of course, when the digitized object is encountered, it is arguably found with the
understanding that the original exists beyond the screen. For we still visit the museum—
we still attend the live performance. Theorist Douglas Davis, in a 1995 critique on
Benjamin’s theory applied to digital media, asserts, “[Benjamin] erred in assuming that
the world would bow to logic, that the endless reproduction of a painting or a photograph
would diminish what he called the ‘aura’ of the original…We still bid wildly at auctions
and employ armies of scholars to find the ‘original,’ the ‘authentic’ masterpiece” (384).
While aura may be endangered by reproduction, authenticity gains more authority with
the increasing amount of copies that proliferate. Benjamin’s examination of original and
copy is furthered by Groys, a comparison that he defines as topological. Groys clarifies,
“the original has a specific historical site, and it is through this site that the original is
inscribed into history as a unique object. The copy, by contrast, is virtual, placeless,
ahistorical; from the very beginning, it manifests itself as potential multiplicity” (26).
This is not the culture industry’s sleight of hand, tricking us into thinking that what glows
from our screen could possibly be an original. Adorno makes an observation in The
Culture Industry that remains relevant to the new conditions of the digital age. He
concludes, “Imagination is replaced by a mechanically relentless control mechanism
which determines whether the latest imago to be distributed really represents an exact,
accurate and reliable reflection of the relevant item of reality” (64). To contextualize his
thinking in the present moment, I would argue that those at all familiar with digital
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reproduction technology recognize, on some level, that what is encountered on their
Instagram feed should not be considered an original—or at least should be done so with
caution. But why, in an age of convenience, full of easy-to-access reproductions, are we
still seeking the site of their creation? What is it about the authentic auratic experience
that is still attracting the attention of mass culture?
Considerations of music on a critical level have much to do, argues Christoph
Cox 12, with how humans have approached the concept and experience of music over the
course of recorded history: it is either a thing of beauty or something purely mathematical
(149). Cox points out that sounds—described as “invisible, intangible, and ephemeral
entities”—have been regarded in the history of philosophy as secondary attributes of
physical objects yet have little in common with the actual objects themselves (156). The
human experience has maintained a rhythm throughout time, manifest in something far
more fleeting than a brushstroke on canvas or the snap of a shutter. And while the more
static history of art has been well-documented by critics and musicologists, this project
explores the digital reproducibility of music in the 21st century as the backdrop for a
larger conversation on the profundity of an artform’s mode of reproduction to alter the
listener’s perception of self in a highly-connected yet fleetingly-authentic world.
Sound as a secondary attribute to a primary object is worth considering in this
multidimensional approach to aura and apperception. Adorno considers the ear and eye—
the audiovisual elements that typify the digital recording—as together but not equal: 13
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“The ear is passive. The eye is covered by a lid and must be opened; the ear is open and
must not so much turn its attention toward stimuli as seek protection from them” (51). If
you have ever spent time editing the audio quality of a recording after its reproduction,
his point instantly rings true: for while the individual in the crowd can pan the camera
back and forth, their control over what the speakers capture is significantly limited by the
entirety of the soundscape that surrounds them (i.e. screaming fans belting lyrics). The
differential voluntarism involved in hearing with the human ear compared to seeing with
the human eye is thus identical on a digital scale when capturing the live music
performance. In typical Adornian style, the critic expands on passivity by stating,
“Deterioration of the faculty of musical synthesis, of the apperception of music as an
esthetic context of meaning, goes with relapsing into such passivity” (51). But consider
for a moment what may be happening when the eye—the more active of the two—is
handicapped by the optical lens of the camera: is one then focused on the performance or
merely on the reproduction of the performance through the screen of the device?
For there is the opportunity for passive listening in the age of digital reproduction:
listening to music through headphones plugged into an iPhone is easy, much like many
other (and arguably more important) aspects of the human experience that can be
satisfied through the use of mobile phones. If you’re hungry, you make a call to order
take-out; if you’re sick, you send a text message to cancel your date. Again, the level of
convenience that digital devices bring to the 21st century table outnumbers those of the
machine in the previous century. Convenience can be wonderful—we’ve all benefitted
from being able to look up a word or to snap a quick photo on our mobile phones, what
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today have evolved into hand-held computers capable of accessing the Internet nearly
anywhere. But convenience often comes with a price.
And these digital devices are still tools—just like the machine—and how we
interpret them is determined by their use. The presence of mobile phones in public
spaces, for example, is met with some trepidation, and, while they offer a higher degree
of connectivity that is proven to aid in times of crisis, they also present an element of
distraction that can be interpreted as a challenge to face-to-face communication. For
instance, Adorno takes a desolate stance on technology’s social integration: 14 “The neon
signs which hang over our cities and outshine the natural light of the night with their own
are comets presaging the natural disaster of society, its frozen death” (96). Is the digital
device opening the door for new mediums of artistic creativity and communication, or is
it pointing to their end? Nancy Baym, in her 2015 text, Personal Connections in the
Digital Age, echoes these Adornian concerns by critically addressing society’s
relationship with technology in the 21st century. “On the one hand, people express
concern that our communication has become increasingly shallow,” she acknowledges.
“On the other, new media offer the promise of more opportunity for connection with
more people, leading to stronger and more diverse relationships” (1). Baym’s discussion
of connection and digital communication technologies is yin and yang, a fair yet
admittedly optimistic work in the field of media studies. The trend in critical theory since
Benjamin (and before him, for that matter) has been to critique, and the overwhelming
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adoption of digital technology into the lives of everyday people leads theorists to
question these changes as their effects ripple outward.
I would argue that anything new—unless it be some obvious and overwhelming
improvement over what came before—is met with a certain degree of skepticism. Critic
Brian House provides a sense of this critical reaction to culture and technology in his
essay, “Against Listening.” Although not a total luddite, House is, as Baym would
understand, cautious of the power of digital technology to influence culture. He declares,
“Entangled in speakers, headphones, or VR headsets, the subject who is continually
interpellated in acoustic ecology is the listener—eyes closed, head bowed, immobile,
contemplative, concentrating, bored, or dreaming” (165). Making a comment similar to
what Paul Valéry predicted in a 1928 essay 15 also referenced in the “Work of Art”
essay’s first section, House continues to suggest that, nearly a century later, “our social
relationships are captured and capitalized by technological platforms.” Contrary, though,
to what Valéry was only then beginning to uncover, House reveals that the acoustic
economy of listening today is “more than just a matter of sound” (160). To give our full
attention to sound—to this single axiom of experience—is a now artificial act in Western
art practice (160). To some, it would seem that Adorno’s worst fears are not at all being
assuaged in the digital age but are, in fact, being confirmed.
Yet any technology is arguably invented and released into the world in the hope
of bettering some process, making an aspect of daily life more convenient or easier.
Baym gives a voice to the positive aspects of technology as she stresses, “there are still
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competing narratives between phones as ostentatious, expensive, stressful, and prone to
creating bad manners and phones as assuring safety, autonomy, access to others, and
control over the flow of daily life” (53). Many critics—and average technology users—
are unsure about the increasing reliance on technology in the present. But Baym leads us
back to the optimistic, stating that digital devices, while capable of completely subsuming
human experience, “offer the promise that we need never be out of touch with our loved
ones, no matter how long the traffic jam in which we find ourselves. When stuck with our
families, we may import our friends through our mobile devices” (11). When
technologies are new, she implores, they often produce “social and cultural
reorganization and reflection” (2). Baym concludes that these phenomena—digital media
use, device portability, and constant connection—prompt us to question, as she states,
“the very authenticity of our identities, relationships, and practices” (5). Thus, in my
argument, the act of digitally reproducing the live song must not go unquestioned, both
on the level of auratic integrity as well as human apperception and the individual’s sense
of self. To understand the possibilities of digital reproduction and its current massparticipation is not limited to, for example, a seasoned musician like David Byrne or a
technology critic like Nancy Baym. Instead, I’m suggesting that anyone that has attended
a live music performance of any nature can begin to think about how a desire to
reproduce something as ephemeral as music with a device so closely integrated into their
own life can answer unique questions surrounding the power of music, the authenticity of
art, and individuality in an age of digital reproducibility—whether or not they knew to
ask in the first place.
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And while the experience of music in its basic form has always been ephemeral,
music in the 21st century is rarely so. Digital reproducibility captures its existence and
digitizes it into binary—turned into information. Archivist Nora Alter cautions the
increased access to digital information in “Transformations of the Archive.” From an
informational perspective, she considers the conversion of original works to digital
information as “democratized in their dissemination,” which, in line with Benjamin’s
aura, significantly deteriorates their singularity. More plainly, Alter illustrates, “The
process of digitization transforms the heterogeneity of disparate and materially distinct
media such as text, photographs, sound recordings, films, and the like, into a
homogeneous mass of computer data” (156). The reproduction of the art object by means
of digitization and the information imperative of the digital is another important avenue
where Benjamin’s theory of aura and reproducibility breaks down. Instead of the
“plurality of copies” that are produced by mechanical reproduction, 16 it can be deduced
that there is only one copy of the work of art—turned into binary—when digitally
reproduced. Not only is the original work of art—in this case, the live music
performance—being reproduced by means of technical reproducibility, the end result is
constructed not by language or imagery but by numbers. Like Boris Groys, critical
theorist Sabine Eckmann also focuses on digital images in her 2009 essay, “Aura,
Virtuality, and the Simulacrum.” Yet she would appear to be on the side of a hypothetical
Benjamin considering digitization’s shattering of artistic tradition. Eckmann articulates:
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While we may, for example, claim that abstract paintings are indexical of artistic
subjectivity and figurative ones a mediation or reflection of the world in which we
live, digitally conceived images, whether representative or abstract, if we take
them literally, refer to not much more than a mathematical code that transcends
linear time and actual space. Hence, according to the argument against digital art,
the human gesture is ultimately broken and destroyed by the computer. (69)
Eckmann’s claims are reminiscent of Benjamin’s remark: “that which withers in the age
of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art” (221). Technical reproduction,
as first posited by Benjamin, depletes the auratic integrity of an artwork; however, it
could also—based on Eckmann’s statement above—involve and even higher level of
degradation in today’s age of digital reproducibility. Not only is the work of art being
reproduced by its metamorphosis through the binary matrix of the digital device, the
device itself in the 21st century has become increasingly more omnipresent in the
everyday lives of everyday people. No longer must one be a professional photographer to
capture a beautiful image—one now need only reach into their pocket and frame it within
their screen.
This amateur/professional divide is the cornerstone of the 21st century digital
revolution. In their introduction to After the Digital Divide? German Aesthetic Theory in
the Age of New Media, Koepnick and McGlothlin observe, “the advent of modern mass
media redefined what it might mean to engage in aesthetic activity in the first place” (7).
Their introduction points out that the media of 19th and 20th century industrial culture
allowed “the transport [of] culture to the masses rather than inviting select audiences to
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stand in silent admiration in the face of the original” (9). Again, we are still in search of
the aura produced by the plastic arts and the ephemerality of a more dynamic artform like
music, but access to their unique reproductions is today far more widespread than ever
before. And the capability of the individual to reproduce art, unlike in the age of
Benjamin, no longer remains in the hands of the professional. After the Digital Divide
later gives way to a conversation on the remix—the ability of the digital copy to be
further manipulated following the act of reproduction. Of course, this was possible with
analog forms of reproduction, such as photography. Benjamin foregoes an in-depth
discussion on the modification of the photograph in order to highlight film. The cinematic
process specifically is predicated on the ability to remix and modify after the moment of
encounter, what is referred to as cutting—a vital aspect of the “equipment-free aspect of
reality.” This, Benjamin indicates, is “the height of artifice” (233). Thus, by affording
more opportunities to alter the work of art after the moment of its reproduction, one
argument would conclude that there is an even greater deterioration of aura in the digital
age. The basis for such an argument is furthered in the contemporary moment by Lev
Manovich in his essay, “Remixability.” “Since the introduction of the first Kodak
camera, users have had tools to create massive amounts of vernacular media,” he states.
Before the advent of digital technology that was widely designed for and distributed to
the public, Manovich points out that “the media pools of the amateur and those of the
professional did not mix” (47-48). Thus, reproduction technology is sinking deeper into
mass culture in the present moment because of its distribution as well as its user-friendly
design. Given the logic that has thus far been shown, the present moment beholds a larger
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audience with more opportunities to shatter the tradition of art practice. Thanks at least in
part to Apple’s widespread marketing of their iPhone line, the 21st century, I argue, is
witnessing not an equipment-free reality but an introduction to equipment that allows the
user to engage in a potentially reality-free experience. As has already been framed by
House and “Against Listening,” the digital device as a tool lends its user the ability to
either escape their sonic surroundings with headphones or to capture an aspect of their
reality to then remix it into something entirely different. Yet the promise of altered
realities is not, unsurprisingly, left solely to the individual with the device.
In an age of digital reproducibility, music is encountered everywhere: in
advertisements, on car stereos, pumped through headphones emanating from digital
devices—muting the physical space with a sonic topography that can transform the
listener within and without. This transformation of space today can be as easy as reaching
into your pocket. Baym observes in Personal Connections, “We may be physically
present in one space, yet mentally and emotionally engaged elsewhere” (3). Would
Benjamin consider this ability to transcend space an authentic experience? For many, as
Adorno predicted long before the first iPhone came to life, first encounters with music
are today often experienced “from mechanical means of mass reproduction” in a digitally
mediated manner. The act of listening is crucial for Adorno, but a deeper concern is the
means by which listening occurs. Adorno postulates whether “these means have thus
raised the listening level” (1). If one has only experienced music through a mechanical or
digital apparatus, has he or she truly experienced all that music has to offer? If the
ephemeral nature of music is sacrificed (as Adorno is hinting at here), how will the aura
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of the original ever be understood? Brian House has already suggested the rarity of
completely sequestering the individual experience to a single mode of sense perception.
Increased access to digital devices is not as simple as an increase in the listening level.
Listening itself can constitute the abandoning of the body during the experience,
but the introduction of a technological apparatus during said experience will always
require use of the body. House is zeroing in on the “acoustic ecology” of listening—as an
experience exclusively typified by the sense of hearing and nothing else. He argues that
this acoustic economy tends to “sacralize listening,” transforming one of the five senses
into an esoteric practice (159-160). House finds the tendency to seek out a technological
middle-man—i.e. whipping out your iPhone to video the performance—to be a product
of acoustemological conditioning (166), and he later refers to this conditioning as a
technologically mediated act, bolstered by the attention economy ruled by social media.
But this idea also falls in line with the digitally mediated musical experience.
More to the point: to listen to the digital reproduction— entangled in speakers and
headphones, as House would typify it—involves the use of the ear but is, as an action,
facilitated by the body; hands plug in the earbuds, fingers tap the screen to curate the
song, and then can one finally enjoy the sonic experience pumped directly into the ear.
Studies focused on listening and the soundscape have benefitted from critic Salomé
Voegelin and her 2014 work Sonic Possible Worlds: Hearing the Continuum of Sound. In
a critical vein similar to the work produced by House, Voegelin argues that the sociopolitical practice of sound, and the spaciotemporal aspect of music, can integrate a
soundscape within the visual topography of individual or collective experience. She
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solidifies this idea by explaining, “The soundscape makes accessible, audible and
thinkable, alternative states of affairs that allow us to rethink and relive the materiality
and semantics of the real world” (45). David Byrne 17 complements Voegelin’s idea by
writing on the power and possibilities of the individual music experience’s soundscape:
“Music can get us through difficult patches in our lives by changing not only how we feel
about ourselves, but also how we feel about everything outside ourselves” (9). Of course,
the question remains unanswered as to whether or not Benjamin would approve of the
possibilities of sonic worlds—as a shattering of tradition or a renaissance of sound art
practice and consumption.
The digital reproduction of the art object—like mechanical reproducibility that
came before—necessitates the body, but as an act it occurs in space. Yet space in an age
of digital reproduction is not strictly public or private. The device provides the affordance
of choice to the individual user navigating a public space: does one engage with the
world around them or shield them self in the sonic bubble constructed by headphones and
a playlist? Baym continues to think about the complications of space in Personal
Connections, yet she is approaching it from less of an individual standpoint than House.
Where House is an individualist, Baym can be found on a more collectivist spectrum.
Listening through headphones, “head bowed, immobile, contemplative, concentrating,
bored, or dreaming,” per House, can completely remove the individual from whatever
situation in which they find themselves. Steve J. Wurtzler 18 compliments these
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approaches to the personalized soundscape by arguing that the 21st century attention
economy is largely influenced by the personal soundscape’s bubble of sonic protection,
thanks in large part to headphones. According to Wurtzler, “tuning out” reverts the
individual to their own soundscape. “When experienced through headphones,” Wurtzler
continues, “handheld devices attest to a structural tension between the broadcast
programmed music that increasingly fills public and semi-public spaces, and the private,
portable, ubiquitous personal soundscapes” that are constructed through the digital device
(171). Thus music, here again, is an exceptional case. Because of the deep societal
integration of digital reproduction technology and the devices that make them possible, it
is easy to understand Benjamin’s enthusiasm when he marvels, “The cathedral leaves its
locale to be received in the studio of a lover of art; the choral production, performed in an
auditorium or in the open air, resounds in the drawing room” (221). The reproduction—
during the time of Benjamin’s theses as well as in the present moment—is still music as
had been heard, just in different spacetimes with an attached aura either geared toward a
collective encounter (such as in shopping malls or the elevator) or the individual’s
negation of it (by way of the headphones).
Consumption and enjoyment of art during the age of mechanical reproduction was
and had been a much more public experience. Of course, there could be found vast
collections of art in private homes, but the gallery was, to a certain extent, created for the
public exhibition of art. In the present moment’s reconfiguration of space, Baym asks,
“As we lose connection to space, do we also become detached from those nearby whose
social support comprised communities of old and on whose interconnections civil society
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depends” (102)? When there is lack of a “single shared environment,” reveals Baym, “the
metaphor of space quickly unravels” (101). Thus, by the device’s creation of a
personalized space as a sort of bubble within a larger, public space, the integrity of the
reproduction’s aura takes on an individualized meaning during both the reproduction
process and each iteration of its future consumption.
By studying live music, though, space is tantamount to time. While the plastic arts
work in space and present an artificial representation of space, Dahlhaus reminds us that
music also works in time, 19 “not merely in but also through temporal sequence by means
of an artificial temporal exchange of tones” (9). When experiencing the original iteration
of a song in all its ephemerality, one no longer has the opportunity to skip, pause, rewind,
or fast-forward. There is only the moment of its encounter in time, which I would argue
places the onus on the listener to appreciate as much of the experience as possible.
Adorno, perhaps countering himself on an increased capacity to listen, laments 20 that
“humanity in the age of omnipresent radios and gramophones has actually forgotten the
experience of music” (21). Is this why we continue to visit the museum? Is the constant
barrage of musical reproduction herding us to the concert venue? If so, then why begin
the process of reproduction anew once the performance begins? Katrina Somdahl-Sands
and John C. Finn 21 are not only thinking about the spacetime of the live performance, but
also about the possibilities that reproducibility allows in a future time. They write, “the
performance itself still fills that space between the performer and audience members,
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producing a reflexive understanding of the actions taking place” (813). But what happens
when the iPhone is interjected, thrust between audience member and performer? Are
these ephemeral moments being experienced to their full extent? Somdahl-Sands and
Finn continue: “In the case of a mediated performance, the performance is connecting the
real world (now-time) of the viewer with the mediated world (pastpresent time) of the
performance” (813). The logic of digital reproduction understands that the reproduced
copy will be recalled—or, in this case, replayed—at some point in the future, for some
purpose. This was the case during Benjamin’s mechanical age, but today the possibilities
that are allotted the digitally reproduced copy are far more dynamic than the arguably
more static mechanical reproduction, transcending both space and time to operate in a
multitude of other spacetimes. With so many varying opportunities for the work of art to
be reproduced, remixed, encountered, and altered again, I would argue that authenticity
and its meaning is challenged and, like aura, diminished.
The static art object is no longer sufficient to represent the mode of human sense
perception during an age in which technology enables the user to transcend both space
and time—yet the adherence to aura’s crucial spacetime is not at all foregone. The
ephemerality of music—of sound, audio, fleeing space and time—complicates
Benjamin’s approach in that the shift in the realm of reproducibility from the mechanical
to the digital involves a reevaluation not only of aura’s spacetime, but of the art object’s
spacetime as well. What would be considered the “original” work of music in the age of
digital reproducibility (or mechanical reproducibility for that matter)? Is it the encounter
by the audience during the live performance, or is it the more official and distributed
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studio recording? To play with the dialectics of Benjamin’s aura in the 21st century, the
unique spacetime of music is the perfect venue to reevaluate the authenticity of art and
human experience together. For the authentic is arguably more difficult to encounter—
whether due to the affordances of quality in the digital reproduction, the integrity of the
object’s aura that has arguably changed in the digital age, or the proliferation of copies
(perhaps more appropriately, the singular digital copy that can be so widely distributed)
that can be encountered across space and time and devices and platforms.
For a mechanically reproduced copy is an arguably less drastic transformation
than its modern counterpart, the digital reproduction. The digitally reproduced work of
art—considering the information aspect of its reproduction process—can be seen as far
more dynamic, albeit troubling, in its transformation from the original work of art into
the reproduction as information: captured, stored, modified, and redistributed within the
device. As early as the 1990s, Douglas Davis comments on the dynamism of the digitally
reproduced art object: “in the age of digital reproduction [the work of art] is physically
and formally chameleon” (381, emphasis added). Davis is beginning a renewed
understanding of aura as “supple and elastic,” far more so than Benjamin could have
imagined in the first half of the 20th century. The elasticity of aura in the digital age
stretches into the deeper, more personalized realm of the individual’s approach to the
reproduction, an aura described by Davis to be “unique, personal, quivering with the
sense of self” (382). And with the reproduction’s potentially-personalized meaning being
disseminated through the information highways of the Internet and into mobile phones,
the consistency of its aesthetic quality—its semblance to the original object—must also
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adapt to its increased distribution. The information imperative of digital reproduction and
the elasticity of its aura presented by Davis allow the reproduction today to be not only
effortlessly copied as before, but also “endlessly reproduced without degradation, always
the same, always perfect” (382). This digital activity occurs outside of the vacuum of
Benjamin’s spacetime and, thus, does not precipitate a loss in the clarity of the art object.
The loss in clarity by means of “analog reproduction”—as Davis typifies it—is compared
to a series of waves crashing on the beach: “breaking over and over but never precisely in
the same form… just as the copy of the audio or video signal before would always
involve a loss in clarity” (382). Thus, not only does the digitally reproduced work of art
withstand a loss in clarity compared to the original, it is also reproducible by devices that,
unlike the photographic technology of Benjamin’s era, are intensely portable, accessible,
and in the hands (or pockets) of millions.
While the aura of the mechanically reproduced object was diminished in relation
to the loss in quality of the copy, I can argue here that digital reproduction of the art
object—due to the lack of a loss in clarity—has different consequences for the aura of the
reproduction. Quality becomes a concern, for example, when choosing between a camera
loaded with film and one equipped with a digital lens. The tradition of analog
photography is still continued today, yet, to comment on the photography of Benjamin’s
age, there is a drastic difference in the clarity and focus of those reproductions. Although
Benjamin was no technology expert on a scale of equipment, he hints in another essay,
his “Little History of Photography,” that “the most precise technology can give its
products a magical value” (510). The magic value of the reproduction today can be seen
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in both manual photographic reproduction and its digital iteration. Choosing traditional
film over digital storage produces a reproduction, in this example of photography, with
an auratic value noticeably different from the crisp quality of the digital. Furthermore,
and to risk this analysis digressing into the specifics of digital reproduction technology, I
would argue that the cameras built into an iPhone (of any generation since its launch in
2007) wildly surpass those that Benjamin would have known.
I end this section with a powerful mediation on the magic value still inherent in
the reproduction. This is Benjamin writing in his “Little History of Photography” essay,
and I find it to be the most succinct and appropriate conclusion to the power of aura and
its influence on apperception, still retaining its relevance well into the 21st century:
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his subject,
the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of
contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the
subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that longforgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may
rediscover it. (510)
Therefore, the ephemerality of live music can be readily captured by everyday audience
members with their digital devices and then replayed far beyond its encounter. Until
recently, the recording of a live music performance was an arduous task of equipment
and coordination, a production that involved more time and collective contribution to
realize the final product. Today, to reproduce the live music performance is done on such
an individual scale as to render each iteration with an aura still arguably diminished
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compared to the original, authentic experience, yet one more personalized and significant
to the user. The aura of the original is so powerful that even its diminishment through
process reproduction is substantial enough to elicit pause in the viewer, one that will
continue to permeate the digital confines of its stored location to be remixed, replayed,
and rediscovered in a limitless number of spacetimes.
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EPHEMERALITY FOUND:
AUTHENTICITY OF SELF
When music is reproduced and replayed—ripped from its ephemerality yet with
new affordances of recreated space, time, and experience—it can be carried anywhere via
portable platforms like the iPhone. The agility of the digitally reproduced music
performance illustrates the chameleon-like nature of aura that Douglas Davis highlights
above. This adaptability is not only indicative of the affordances mobile phones grant the
user in capturing and consuming art, but also of their capability as communication tools
no longer bound to a fixed location. To contextualize this point, Nancy Baym
emphasizes 22 that “media vary in their mobility.” She considers media’s mobility by
being either portable or stationary. Baym writes that portable media “[enable] people to
send and receive messages regardless of location.” Stationary media, on the other hand,
“[require] that people be in specific locations in order to interact” (11). The iPhone as a
mobile device—albeit not alone—arguably represents the peak of mobility in the digital
age, exemplified in the ease by which everyday users can now reproduce the live music
experience—one that involves both the audible and visual sensorium. Benjamin’s
understanding of the mode of 20th century photography, in retrospect, limited his
observations on human apperception. The “Work of Art” essay comments on the desire to
eliminate distance, but this desire today is well-incorporated into 21st century life.
Furthermore, I would argue that this desire has been satisfied by the proliferation of
mobile devices that have become ubiquitous in modern life. This is not to say that the
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elimination of distance has ended—in fact, it has arguably been amplified within the
conscience of everyday living.
The ubiquity of digital devices like the iPhone is bolstered by both portability and
functionality. These aspects are eventually translated to the reproduction of the art object
in that the original can be captured and transported far away from its place of origin—
rendering it more portable—and can be furthered modified—thus functioning outside of
its original intent—far beyond the moment of encounter. Somdahl-Sands and Finn
consider the consumption of the digitally reproduced copy in the past and present as what
I would argue to be a metaphor for furthering the concept of portability—transporting the
reproduction not only through space, but through time. “The mediated performance is
[the audience member’s] now,” they write. However, it is made clear, “Through a
mediated performance, a past performance and a present moment are collapsed into a
pastpresent” (812-813). The challenge of space was the primary influence on Benjamin’s
critique of aura and reproducibility, shown through his critique on distance. Today,
however, there is the added dimension of time which complicates an approach to digital
reproducibility as an understanding of human apperception and sense of self. Not only
does the digital reproduction transcend space—as did its mechanically-captured
predecessor—I argue that it has the ability to compress or expand the viewer’s sense of
time during its secondary encounter. Not only can the device stage the reproduction of
audio using built-in microphones, its screen presents dynamic images captured through
the camera function that further contributes to the proliferation and reproduction of the
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work of art. In an introductory quip by Wurtzler, 23 he maintains, “[portable devices]
instantiate both the live and the recorded. They inhabit the realm not of ‘either/or’ but
instead of ‘not only but also’” (170). The not-only-but-also element of the live recording
parallels with the idea of the pastpresent presented by Somdahl-Sands and Finn above.
The ephemerality of music and its digital reproduction, therefore, not only operates in
time but, as has been shown, space as well. Both time and space, like the relationship
between the integrity of aura and the mode of apperception, are closely linked in the
reproduction of the live music performance.
Authenticity, while still sought out by mass culture, continues to be endangered
for both aura and apperception: what does it mean for a thing—an object, an experience,
a thought—to be authentic? Would an individual’s personal recording of a concert hold
more auratic integrity than a production like The Beastie Boys’ Awesome? Digital
technologies—especially those like the iPhone and its use during the auratic experience
of live music performance—ultimately lead to the questioning of not only what it means
for the work of art to be authentic but also, as Baym reveals, “what it means to be
authentically human” (178). The world can now be contextualized through digital
devices, but is this contextualization an authentic representation of individual reality and
sense of self? Does a collection of reproductions function as a kind of collage by which to
see through the binary of digital reproduction and the authentic art experience behind it?
While the work of art is not the only thing in contemporary society being digitally
reproduced, its reproducibility is arguably illustrative of the wide-spread incorporation of
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communication and information technology into modern society. Baym ends her
Personal Connections by stating, “Digital media aren’t saving us or ruining us. They
aren’t reinventing us. But they are changing the ways we relate to others and ourselves in
countless, pervasive ways” (177). From the telegraph to the Internet, technology has
quickly opened the door for the dissemination of information on a scale that mirrored
what was made possible with machines such as the cotton gin or Henry Ford’s assembly
line. Convenience is the siren song of progress, and machines not only helped to make
work more efficient but have also led to advances in the way humans could communicate
in their time of leisure. The communication imperatives of the late 20th and early 21st
centuries have revolutionized the world of individual experience and have empowered
mass culture with tools that would have been inconceivable by Benjamin in the 1930s.
But with such an increased ability to reproduce the art object by both professional and
nonprofessional individuals, I have argued in this essay that society’s sense of
individuality has become sorely limited.
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CONCLUSION; OR, ENCORE
Are we losing a sense of community and connection with the art object by the
distracting nature of the screen? Is this simply another form of “commodity listening,” a
“reception in a state of distraction” of the art object and a shallow negation of the full
capacity of the aura? And, more importantly, what makes the lover of art reach into their
pocket for their iPhone in the first place? The key difference in an age of digital
reproducibly is that mobile devices are being used as part of the process of apperception,
allowing the individual to contextualize the complex and ever-changing world through
their device. Douglas Davis understands this as society attempting “to find ways to
increase the power of our subjective presence in the other reality, precisely as the painter
orders his or her field” (385). Thus, the attempt to arrest the ephemeral experience before
it is gone can be read as frustration over a sense of self away from the digital. Nancy
Baym 24 puts it this way: “The social concerns that we voice when we discuss technology
are concerns that we would have even if there were no technology around” (55).
Communication technologies provide devices—tools—that can be used to better
understand the complexity of modern life, a way to slow things down while
simultaneously keeping pace with the quickening flow of mass culture. Arresting the art
object, attempting to bring it closer, transporting its reproduction—these all indicate a
perception of contemporary life as constantly changing and, indeed, chameleon.
Is the time right to consider what may come after the age of digital
reproducibility? Davis leaves us with the following: “Only the unwary mind would deny
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the further inevitability that a ‘neurasthenic’ computer, programmed by humanoid
codes…will shortly create paintings form first stroke to last” (383). Perhaps digital
reproducibility will continue to grow in its sphere of influence over human apperception,
and it will arguably produce more artforms as the age progresses. Mass culture, of course,
will always be receptive—albeit weary at times—of new technology, but it will not give
its nod of approval willingly and immediately. How technology is used, how art is
reproduced, is largely up to the individual. While it is still difficult to observe the full
societal effects of reproducibility in the 21st century, the integrity of aura is indeed still
intact—flexible yet decidedly altered since the time of Benjamin’s critique. Human
apperception will continue to conform to changes within mass culture and will perhaps
shift away from being framed by a troubled sense of self. Yet, at the rate of change by
which the tradition of the present moment is constantly shattered, what the future holds—
for both the lover of art and the wielder of technology—is just as uncertain today as
would today have been for Benjamin.
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